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Preface 
Most of the lessons learned for policy makers from past international negotiations have been 
derived from descriptive assessments of particular cases taken one at a time. The objective of this 
study is to develop a truly comparative and systematic approach to negotiation analysis that will 
provide the capability to draw lessons from a larger and more representative data base of negotiation 
cases. 
Structured interviews were conducted with 23 Austrian diplomats to gather information about 
particular international negotiation cases that they personally participated in. These interviews were 
coded into a taxonomy of important negotiation elements to develop a data base that describes each 
negotiation case as a profile of 35 key factors. These data were then analyzed systematically to derive 
a better understanding of the process of international negotiation and how that process leads to 
successful outcomes or deadlock. 
One of the most important findings is the effectiveness of bilateral negotiations. They are 
more likely than multilateral negotiations to be characterized by successful treaties, low delegation 
turnover, friendly political relations, and deadlines that are met. Bilateral negotiations may be a more 
cost-effective alternative to participation in multilateral forums: fewer transaction costs and better 
outcomes. 
This project was undertaken in collaboration with Prof. Gerhard Hafner, Institute for 
International Law and International Relations, Vienna and Dr. Paul Luif, Austrian Institute for 
International Affairs, Laxenburg. 
The author would like to thank the Leader of the Processes of International Negotiation (PIN) 
Project, Bertram I. Spector, as well as the project team members, Cecilia Albin, Anna Korula, and 
John Rohrbaugh, for their constructive comments, suggestions and assistance in interviewing and 
analyzing the data. 
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BACKGROUND 
This study is an attempt to develop a methodological approach for comparing diverse cases 
of international negotiations. The approach is systematic. It uses advanced statistical techniques to 
discover relationships among aspects of negotiation and to compare cases along common dimensions. 
It derives from earlier efforts to develop taxonomies of activities, behaviors, or events that serve as 
a basis for analysis of similarities or dissimilarities among cases. 
Four studies, in particular, each on a different topic, contributed to the development of the 
approach. Sells (1966) used 56 social-system characteristics, organized into eight categories 
(objectives, value systems, personnel composition, organization, technology, physical environment, 
temporal characteristics), to compare various situational contexts (e.g., submarines, exploration 
parties, remote duty stations) to that of an extended duration spaceship mission. The most similar 
profiles were obtained for submarines followed by exploration parties, naval ships, and bomber crews; 
the least similar profiles were obtained for shipwrecks and industrial work groups. Frederiksen 
(1971) proposed categories for a taxonomy of activities that can be used to judge similarities among 
situations in terms of the behaviors they elicit. The taxonomies were intended to contribute to 
investigations of person-situation interactions. [Further development of situation taxonomies can be 
found in Fleishman and Quaintance, 1984.1 
A particularly ambitious project along these lines was reported by Bloomfield and Beattie 
(1971). They developed a computerized model, referred to as CASCON, for depicting and comparing 
international crises. In its initial version, CASCON consisted of 482 factors (general statements about 
local conflicts) divided into three phases of a crisis. Fourteen cases were coded in terms of whether 
each factor tended toward or away from increased violence. With regard to international negotiation, 
Druckrnan and Iaquinta (1974) devised a set of categories that could be used to code diverse cases. 
The categories consisted largely of variables examined in the experimental bargaining literature. 
Carrying this work forward, the present analysis uses similar categories to code a set of past or 
recently-completed negotiations in which Austrian delegations participated. 
This approach to comparing negotiations is an alternative to the more frequently-used 
qualitative assessments of similarities and differences among cases (e.g., Zartman, 1993; Sjiistedt, 
1993). Both approaches contribute important insights about influences and processes of negotiation. 
The quantitative approach permits an analyst to make comparisons among numerous cases; the 
qualitative approach allows for indepth understanding of particular cases. When used together, the 
two approaches provide both range in terms of coverage and depth in terms of understanding. The 
range covered by quantitative analysis of many cases also allows an investigator to explore 
relationships among the coded variables. Rather than to compare the cases in terms of the variables, 
this analysis uses the cases to compute relationships among the variables which are considered to be 
aspects of a negotiation. This kind of analysis contributes to a more general literature on negotiation.' 
Results obtained from both types of analyses are discussed in this working paper. 
This paper is a report of progress made to date. It is organized into three parts. First, we 
describe the interview and coding procedures. Analytical procedures are illustrated with an earlier 
comparison of cases. Second, the results of the analyses are presented: relationships among the 
variables and case comparisons are discussed. Details on codes and results are contained in 
Appendices. And, third, some implications of the analyses and next steps are proposed. 
'The scientific literature on negotiation consists largely of laboratory experiments or simulations. 
The use of cases as "data" has the advantage of being more realistic than the experiments. It has the 
disadvantage of having less control over the definition and timing of variables, making it difficult to 
infer causation. 
PROCEDURES 
Data for this analysis were collected through interviews. The questions were designed to 
provide information about a large variety of processes and influences discussed in the research 
literature on negotiation. The information was then translated into coding categories for use in the 
statistical analyses. In this section, we describe briefly the procedures used to collect and analyze the 
data gathered from the interviews. The discussion is organized into four parts: the variables, the 
interviews, the codes, and the analysis methods. 
The Variables 
The variables were chosen to represent each of eight general aspects of international 
negotiation: its structure, the composition of delegations, bureaucratic support provided to the 
delegations, the issues, the negotiating situation, the process, outcomes, and external events. These 
categories are usually presented as elements in conceptual frameworks of negotiation (e.g., Randolph, 
1966; Sawyer and Guetzkow, 1965; Druckman and Iaquinta, 1974; Druckman, 1977; Kremenyuk, 
1991). For some of the categories, the variables are those that have received attention in the scientific 
literature on negotiation. Many of them were shown in experiments to have strong effects on 
negotiating processes or outcomes (see Druckman, 1993). Examples include whether the negotiations 
were conducted in private or public (structure), whether the issues were primarily about interests or 
ideologies (issues), the existence of deadlines, third parties, and alternatives to a negotiated agreement 
(situation), studying or strategizing in prenegotiation sessions (process), comprehensiveness of the 
agreement (outcome), and outside influences (events). For other categories, the variables come from 
case studies or discussions with diplomats about their experiences (see McDonald and Bendahmane, 
1990). Examples include delegation size and turnover (composition of delegation), latitude in 
instructions and tracking by high-level officials (bureaucratic support), packaging of issues (issues), 
the binding quality of the agreement (outcomes), and linkages with other negotiations (external 
events). A complete listing of variables is found in Appendix A. Each of these variables was 
represented by a question in the interview. 
The Interviews 
Interviews were conducted with 23 diplomats in the Austrian Foreign, Environment, and 
Science and Research Ministries. The diplomats (herein referred to as respondents) were asked to 
report about a past or recently-concluded negotiation in which they participated in the Austrian 
delegation. Each interview was conducted in English, primarily by one or two members of IIASA's 
PIN project staff. Respondents were contacted well in advance of the appointment, were given 
information about the purpose and format of the interview, and told that it would last between an hour 
and an hour and a half. They were also informed that their responses to the questions would remain 
anonymous and used only for analytical p ~ r p o s e s . ~  
A 14-page interview guide was developed (see Appendix B). The questions were organized 
in terms of the eight categories listed above. Many questions were relatively open-ended, allowing 
respondents to elaborate on the responses if they desired: For example, "how would you characterize 
the pattern of concession-making?" Some questions encouraged them to choose among alternatives: 
For example, "please rate each issue as being highly complex, somewhat complex, or not complex 
at all; on the same rating scale, how technical do you consider the issue?" Each section also included 
a final question that asked for "any other observations about the negotiation that you would like to 
make." An additional set of questions on "analytical support" was included in the guide to elicit 
information for a related project (Spector, 1993). Respondents' answers were written down on the 
spot; tape recorders were not used. The answers were translated into codes, discussed next. 
%is report will be made available to all participants in the project. 
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The Codes 
Responses to each question were coded according to categories that captured the variation in 
responses given by all respondents. The coding procedure translated answers to the questions into 
scaled variables. It consisted of three steps. First, responses given to each question by each 
respondent were recorded verbatim. Second, the various responses were summarized by categories 
that reflected the different types of answers. Some variables consisted of categorical distinctions such 
as "interests" or "ideology" or economic, environmental, or security negotiations. Other variables 
took the form of a scale that distinguished between "highly involved," "somewhat involved," "not 
involved." An attempt was made to ensure that the set of categories for each question reflected a 
relatively symmetrical distribution of responses: for example, on the number of delegations, the 
distribution of responses in four categories is 7, 5, 6, and 5. For some questions, however, little 
variation in responses was shown (a very asymmetrical distribution of responses): for example, all 
cases were held in a central rather than peripheral location. Most of these questions were not used 
as variables in the analysis. Third, numbers were assigned to the categories resulting in "scales" 
with varying ranges (either 2, 3, or 4 steps). The complete set of codes is shown in Appendix A. 
These codes were used in the analyses described next. 
The Analysis 
Thirty-five variables were used in the analysis. The study design is correlational. By this 
we mean that no attempt was made to establish causal relationships among the variables. Nor do we 
assume that particular variables preceded others in time. All variables are related to each other in 
the form of a matrix of correlations: the 35 variables produce 592  correlation^.^ Two types of 
m e  type of correlation computed is the gamma coefficient. This is a measure of non-parametric 
correlation that makes few assumptions about scaling of variables or frequency distributions. It 
analyzes the pattern of responses in contingency tables and is well suited to the type of data collected 
analyses were computed. One sought to discover relationships among the various parts of international 
negotiation as depicted in the interviews. For these analyses, correlations are computed among the 
variables across the 23 cases. In addition, selected variables were analyzed by discriminant analysis. 
This technique provides a ranking among variables in terms of their relative importance in 
distinguishing among the categories of another variable. For example, we ask which variables are 
most (least) important in distinguishing among bilateral, small, medium, and large negotiations or 
among the various types of negotiations. (See Klecka, 1980, for a detailed discussion of discriminant 
analysis.) Another analysis sought to discover similarities and dissimilarities among the cases. Here, 
the 23 cases are compared across the variables. Similarities and dissimilarities are depicted in terms 
of a twodimensional space that results from multidimensional scaling (MDS). (For details on this 
technique, see Kruskal and Wish, 1990.) Before turning to the results, we present an example of 
an earlier PIN Project study in which 12 cases of international negotiation were analyzed with MDS. 
Example of an MDS application. An earlier analysis examined 12 cases divided roughly 
among arms control (ABM, SALT, test-ban), trade and politics (GATT, European Single Act), and 
environmental (Montreal Protocol, Acid Rain, Transboundary Air Pollution, Convention on 
Notification and Assistance in Case of Nuclear Accidents) negotiations. Secondary sources (published 
descriptions of the case) were used to code each case on 12 variables representing some of the same 
aspects of negotiation used in this study (e.g., number of parties, relationship among the parties, third 
parties, turnover, external events, concessions). The 12 x 12 matrix of correlations was input into the 
MDS program to discern similarities and dissimilarities among the cases. The resulting cluster of the 
cases in two dimensions is shown in Figure 1. The more similar the cases across the 12 variables, 
the more closely situated they are in the figure. 
for this study. (See Goodman and Kruskal, 1954, for a discussion of this statistic.) 
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Thus, cases in the same quadrant are quite similar; note the close clustering of the three arm-control 
cases. Based on the distribution of cases, we are able to name each of the two dimensions. The 
horizontal dimension, running from west to east, captures a progression of cases from bilateral to 
large multilateral talks. The vertical dimension, running from north to south, captures the difference 
between those talks that are centered on primarily European problems and those that are non- 
European centered or are more global in their focus and implications. A closer look at the codes 
assigned the cases would provide further insights into the specific aspects of the negotiation that are 
similar or dissimilar. The same analysis procedure is used in this study. However, we analyze a 
greatly-expanded number of variables (35) and cases (23) using primary (interviews with participants) 
rather than secondary sources. 
This section is divided into two parts. First, we present the results of analyses that examine 
relationships among the variables across the cases. Second, the results of the MDS analysis are 
discussed. 
Relationships Among Variables 
As noted above, the variables are related to each other in the form of a large [35 x 351 matrix 
of correlations shown in Appendix C. Our challenge is to highlight key relationships in this matrix. 
We do this in three ways. First, relationships among the subsets of questions asked in each part of 
the interview are discussed. Second, the way certain variables impact on processes and outcomes are 
examined. Third, special attention is given to variables that have received attention in the literature 
on negotiation andlor were shown in this analysis to produce a large number of relationships with 
other variables. 
Aspects of Negotiation 
It will be recalled that the interview was divided into eight parts, each representing an aspect 
of international negotiation. Results obtained for each part are discussed in turn. 
Structure of negotiation. Four significant relationships were obtained among the structural 
variables. 
a. Bilateral negotiations were more likely to be held in private than multilateral 
negotiation [indicated by a correlation of .7 between the number of delegations and whether the 
negotiation was private, mixed, or public]. 
b. Private negotiations were characterized by fewer informal meetings than public 
negotiations [indicated by a correlation of -.48 between the public or private and the frequency of 
informal meetings]. 
c. Private meetings were characterized by a more highly involved secretariat 
[indicated by a correlation of .57 between these variables]. 
d. Negotiations that involved more preparation had more informal meetings than 
those in which preparation time was relatively short [indicated by a correlation of .59 between these 
variables]. 
Composition of delegations. The variables in this cluster were relatively independent. None 
of the relationships were significant. However, two relationships with structural variables are noted. 
More turnover of delegates occurred among the larger delegations and the Austrian delegation was 
more powerful in the negotiations where it had relatively small delegation size. The weakest variables 
overall - in terms of relationships with variables in other categories - were in this cluster: namely, 
technical expertise on the delegation, size of the delegation, and the relationship between the 
delegations. 
Bureaucratic support. Four relationships were significant among the bureaucratic support 
variables. The cluster included relationships among tracking by high-level officials, the extent to 
which delegates were constrained by instructions, the latitude given to delegates in the instructions, 
and whether analytical support was given to the delegation. The key variable in this category was 
tracking: the more the tracking, the more the delegation was constrained by instructions, the less 
latitude given them in the instructions, and the more analytical support provided. Further, more 
analytical support was provided in negotiations where the delegation was closely tracked by high-level 
government officials. 
Issues. Negotiations about many issues were primarily about interests rather than ideological 
concerns. When interests were primarily at stake, the issues were more likely to be discussed in 
combination, as packages. 
The negotiating situation. Delegates had attractive alternatives to a negotiated agreement 
when deadlines were not firm and when third parties were not present. It would seem that third 
parties were simply not needed to resolve disputes when delegates had attractive alternatives. Facing 
a deadline without an attractive alternative is one way of securing an agreement, which occurred in 
most of these cases. As expected, negotiations that were widely covered by the media were those in 
which there was considerable awareness of the issues being contested. Third parties were also more 
likely to be involved in the widely-covered negotiations. 
The negotiation process. A more stage-like (proceeding in a linear fashion) negotiation 
process occurred when the talks were relatively open (parties shared rather than concealed 
information), when they discussed the issues in terms of packages, and when they studied the issues 
rather than strategized prior to the formal discussions. m e  latter relationship is particularly strong 
as indicated by a .98 correlation.] As expected, more threats were issued in less open negotiations. 
The outcome. Practically all the cases considered in this analysis concluded with an 
agreement. Thus, outcomes were construed in terms of the f w e  of agreement reached: whether it 
was a treaty and the comprehensiveness of the agreement. These measures were correlated. Treaties 
were more likely to be comprehensive (rather than partial) agreements in the sense that all issues were 
resolved. 
Events and political relationships. The three variables in this cluster were outside 
influences, political relationships, and linkages to other talks. More linkages were made to other 
negotiations among friendly delegations and in negotiations influenced by outside events. 
Influences on Processes and Outcomes 
The scientific literature on negotiation examines the impact of various factors on processes 
and outcomes. In this study, i~r~pacts are examined on three aspects of the process, its openness, the 
frequency with which threats are made, and the extent to which the process is stage-like. Relationships 
are also explored on the two key outcome variables, whether a treaty or less binding agreement was 
negotiated and the comprehensiveness of the agreement. Following are summaries of the significant 
relationships. 
Stage-like processes. Negotiations were viewed as being more stage-like (proceeding from 
early to late discussions in a linear fashion) after the parties studied the issues for a short period, 
when only a few major issues were discussed among a small number of delegations, when these issues 
were primarily ideological, when the talks were private but open, when there was an involved 
secretariat, positive relations among the delegations, and few outside influences. Particularly strong 
relationships occurred for the study and outside influence variables: stage-like processes were 
especially likely to occur when delegates studied the issues prior to negotiating them and when there 
were few outside influences. Studying the issues produced a stage-like process; outside influences may 
serve to interfere with that progression. 
Open processes. Open processes occurred when the talks were more stage-like and there 
were few threats made by the delegates. They occurred when only a few issues were on the table in 
private discussions, when there were only a few outside influences and when relationships among the 
delegates were generally friendly. 
Threats. More threatening statements were made in negotiations characterized by informal 
discussions. As expected, they were also more frequent when the political relationships among the 
delegation were negative. 
These process are interrelated: as noted above, more open processes were associated with both 
stage-like progressions and few threats. Each was associated strongly with the frequency of outside 
influences and/or the type of political relationship among the delegations. These external factors may 
be viewed as "driving forces" on the process, if not producing, then, at least, coinciding with whether 
a negotiation is stage-like, open, and characterized by few or many threats. 
Treaties. The conditions for treaties were relatively small delegations, the development of 
packages of related issues, preparing by studying the issues, few major issues on the table, few 
outside influences, relatively private discussions, and attractive alternatives to a negotiated agreement. 
The strongest influences on treaties were number of parties (fewer parties were more likely to result 
in treaties) and whether the talks were public or private (more private discussions were more likely 
to result in treaties). The process variables discussed above were not related to whether a treaty or 
other type of agreement emerged from the talks. Processes and outcomes were, however, influenced 
by similar variables, namely, studying the issues, number of issues on the table, and outside 
influences. 
Comprehensiveness of the agreement. More comprehensive agreements were obtained when 
there were fewer outside influences and positive political relations among the delegations. They also 
occurred more frequently when large delegations had attractive alternatives to the terms of agreement 
on the table. 
Treaties and comprehensive agreement were correlated: Treaties usually took the form of 
comprehensive, rather than partial, agreements. Both outcomes occurred more often when there were 
few outside influences and when the delegates had attractive alternatives. Outside influences also 
correlated with the process measures. Alternatives related strongly to outcomes, not to processes. 
Kev Variabla 
The literature on international negotiation pays special attention to the differences between 
bilateral and multilateral forums (Zartman, 1993), the types of issues being negotiated (Ikle, 1964), 
and the role played by third parties (Bercovitch and Rubin, 1992). These analyses elucidate some 
correlates of each of these key variables. 
Bilateral vs. multilateral forums. This variable produced a substantial number of significant 
correlations with the other aspects of negotiation coded for this study. Small, as contrasted to large 
forums, had less turnover of delegates, more high-level interest in the negotiation, less firm deadlines, 
more private discussions, more attractive alternatives (BATNAs: Best Alternative to a Negotiated 
Agreement), were more likely to prepare by studying the issues, more packaging of the issues, a more 
stage-like process, and more friendly political relations between the national delegations. In addition, 
treaties were more likely to result from the smaller negotiations. Taken together, these 10 variables 
distinguished between small and large conferences very well: based on discriminant analysis, 83% 
of the cases were correctly classified as either bilateral or multilateral on the basis of these variables. 
The strongest variables in this list were turnover (more turnover of delegates in large conferences), 
treaties (more likely for small conferences), deadlines (firmer in larger conferences), and public 
versus private venues (smaller conferences were more private). 
Type of negotiation. The 23 cases were grouped into four issue-area categories: economic, 
environmental, security, and other. Strong relationships with type were obtained for five variables. 
While the economic cases took longer, they tended to be more informal, construed the issues in 
packages, had a highly involved secretariat, and the delegations had more attractive alternatives than 
those in environmental or security talks. Together, these variables distinguished among the types of 
cases with 65% accuracy: 65% of the cases were classified correctly by discriminant analysis which 
only uses information about these 5 variables. The strongest discriminating variables were an 
involved secretariat (more involved in economic talks) and length (economic talks were longer). 
Third-party involvement. Third parties were more likely to be used in complex (many 
issues) and competitive negotiations (strategizing, negative relations, unattractive BATNAs) that focus 
primarily on interests (rather than ideology), and when the negotiation is protracted with few informal 
meetings and high turnover of delegates. Outside influences and an involved secretariat were also 
conditions for the use of third parties. Complexity seemed to be the most compelling reason for using 
third parties: number of issues produced the strongest relationship with third parties. However, the 
use of third parties was not related to processes or outcomes. The conditions for intervention 
identified in this analysis did not seem to have implications for the conseauences of third-party 
intervention. 
Discussion 
Several implications of these findings can be offered. They are summarized in terms of 
answers to four questions asked about influences, processes, and outcomes. 
What aspects of negotiation have the strongest, and which have the weakest, impact on 
processes and outcomes? 
The external factors of political relationships and outside influences related strongly to both 
processes and outcomes. While friendly political relations had positive influences on processes (open, 
stage-like, and few threats) and outcomes (comprehensive agreements), outside influences had 
negative impacts on both processes (less open, less stage-like) and outcomes (less likely to be a treaty 
or a comprehensive agreement). Linkages to other forums had a negligible impact on processes or 
outcomes but were correlated with political relationships (more linkages with positive relations). 
Better processes and outcomes also resulted from fewer parties, studying the issues prior to 
negotiation, and relatively private settings. The cluster of variables referred to as bureaucratic 
support (instructions, tracking, latitude, and analytical support) were related to one another but did 
not correlate with either process or outcome variables. 
Can outcomes be predicted from processes? 
Outcomes did not derive directly from processes. Relationships between the process and 
outcome variables were weak. The outcomes attained in these cases appeared to be influenced more 
by aspects of the situation (studying the issues, public or private forums), outside influences, and the 
attractiveness of alternatives. Some of these relationships are shown in Figure 2 below (numbers 
along the arrows connecting the variables are correlations). 
Are smaller conferences more or less effective than larger conferences? 
Smaller conferences are more likely to result in treaties as well as proceed in more stage-like 
fashion than larger conferences. This difference may be due to three intervening factors shown to 
relate both to size and outcomes: studying the issues, attractive BATNAs, and private discussions. 
Size of the negotiation is also shown below to be a key dimension in clustering the cases in terms of 
similarities and dissimilarities. 
Rgure 2. Relationships Among Selected Variables 
Outside l n f  luences 
Pol i t  i c a l  Re la t i onsh ips  
Can negotiators alter situations to produce desirable outcomes or processes? 
Study 
Some of the significant influences on outcomes identified in this analysis can be controlled 
more easily than others. If treaties and comprehensive agreements are desired, negotiators can 
A 
Pub l i c- P r  i va te  
.51 
influence whether the delegations study or strategize prior to negotiation, whether the talks are private 
- 
.98 
or public, and whether to package the issues under consideration. They are likely to have less control 
BATNAs Processes 
over the number of delegations or outside influences. Whether negotiators study or strategize and 
the privacy of the deliberations are also controllable factors shown to influence the process. More 
- 
1.0 
generally, the variables in the categories of negotiation structure (size, power differences) and external 
Outcomes 
factors (relationships, events) are more difficult to control or manipulate. Those in the categories of 
delegate composition (size of delegation, turnover), bureaucratic support (instructions, tracking), and 
situation (deadlines, location) are easier to alter. 
Similarities and Dissimilarities Among the Cases 
The 23 cases were compared in terms of the "profiles" of codes on the variables. The 
statistical procedures used to make the comparisons contribute to the development of a methodology 
for making systematic comparisons among diverse cases of negotiation. The procedures are the same 
as those used in our earlier analysis of 12 cases from secondary sources described above. For these 
analyses, the correlations are used as indicators of similarity between pairs of cases. Higher (lower) 
correlations between cases indicate more (less) similarity across the variables. The correlations are 
then input as data for the multidimensional scaling analysis. That analysis reduces the large number 
of correlations to two dimensions that define four quadrants in which the cases are seen to cluster. 
The dimensions impose order on the set of cases; naming them provides meaning to the exercise. 
The results, shown in Figure 3, consist of a two-dimensional space in which the 23 cases are 
situated. Together, the two dimensions account for 64% of the variation in the cases. Of the two 
dimensions, the horizontal, running from west to east, is stronger than the vertical dimension running 
from north to south: the former accounts for 42% of the case variation while the latter accounts for 
22% of the variation. The horizontal dimension is also easier to name. Moving along the dimension, 
it is possible to discern a progression from smaller bilateral negotiations to larger multilateral talks. 
As depicted in Figure 4, the three clusters, going from west to east, consist of bilateral, small 
multilateral, and medium to large multilateral cases respectively. This size dimension is also evident 
in the correlation between each of the two dimensions and the number of parties variable: the 
horizontal dimension correlates .81 with parties while the vertical dimension shows only a .14 
correlation with that variable. High correlations are also shown between this dimension and the 
various correlates of size discussed above: namely, turnover of delegates, treaty outcomes, stage-like 
processes, packaged issues, political relations, public or private forums, and alternatives to an 
agreement. Thus, moving from west to east, the horizontal dimension distinguishes small, bilateral 
cases from larger, multilateral cases along with the associated characteristics of size. Examples of 
cases in each of the three clusters shown in Figure 3 are the EFTA-EC talks (bilateral), the European 
Environmental Transboundary discussions (small multilateral), and the UNCED Rio Declaration or 
the Biodiversity Convention negotiations (large multilateral). Closer examination of the coded 
variables for each case would reveal other factors either that they have in common or that distinguish 
among them. 
The dimension running from north to south is more difficult to name. The strongest 
correlations with this dimension are between it and the issue variables: packages, number of major 
issues, and whether the issues involve interests or ideologies. It also correlates strongly with the use 
of third parties. This set of relationships suggests a dimension going from highly complex 
negotiations (in the north quadrants) to less complex talks (in the south quadrants). However, since 
the cases do not cluster in an obvious way, as with the horizontal dimension, this name remains 
conjectural. 
Figure 3. 23 Negotiations in Two Dimensions 
I: A: EFTA - EC Economic Area 
M: EFTA - EC Environment 
I: Austria - EC Membership 
H: EC - Austria Transition 
N: EFTA - Third Country 
J: European Env. Impact Ass. Transboundary 
W: OECD 
11: G: Biodiversity Convention 
Q: Climate Change 
F: CSCE - Peaceful Settlements 
K: UNCED - Rio Declaration 
P: UNGA - Peacekeeping 
E: CSCE - Helsinki Follow-Up 
L: UNGA - Legal 
III: D: Austria - PoliticallDiplomatic 
S: Austria - Italy Legal 
U: EFTA - EC 
T: Transboundary Air Pollution 
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V: Socialist International 
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figure 4. The Size Dimension 
The dimensional structure shown in the figures reflects the set of 35 variables on which all 
the cases were coded. In order to ascertain the extent to which these results are constrained by that 
particular set of variables, we performed another scaling analysis on a smaller sample of 10 variables 
chosen from each of the categories: namely, number of delegations, power, technical knowledge, 
turnover, delegation size, political relations, openness of process, bindingness of the agreement, 
comprehensiveness of the agreement, and type of negotiation. Interestingly, with only a few 
exceptions, the cases were situated in the same quadrant or, with regard to "border" cases, near the 
quadrant in which they were located in the analysis based on 35 variables. A clear size dimension 
was apparent for the horizontal dimension while similar problems existed in attempting to name the 
vertical dimension. These results suggest a robust conference size dimension. It captures the pattern 
of cases for both large and small samplings of the coded variables. 
The scaling analyses are highly aggregated. They summarize similarities and dissimilarities 
among the cases in terms of many variables. It is also possible to depict relationships at a 
considerably less aggregated level, for example, the way the cases cluster on just two variables. This 
clustering is illustrated in Figures 5,6,  and 7. Codings between size of negotiation and each of three 
correlated variables -- deadlines, treaties, and turnover -- are shown4. The smaller negotiations (e.g., 
EC-Austria Transition) are characterized by either no deadlines or deadlines that are not firm. Many 
of the larger conferences (e.g., Biodiversity Convention) have firm deadlines for producing an 
agreement as indicated by the cases coded as 3 or 4 on size and 1 on deadlines (see Figure 5). m e  
correlation between these variables is -51.1 Smaller conferences were more likely to achieve treaties 
while larger negotiations usually resulted in either binding or non-binding agreements but not treaties 
[A correlation between these variables of .63 summarizes the patterns shown in Figure 6.1 And, 
smaller negotiations had less turnover of delegates than the larger conferences. [A correlation between 
these variables of .79 summarizes the way the cases cluster as shown in Figure 7.1 These analyses 
are intended to be illustrative. Other analyses of the cases on pairs of variables can be performed: 
For example, between the variables shown to correlate with processes or outcomes.The interested 
reader is encouraged to perform these analyses using the codes provided in Appendix D. 
Discussion 
An overriding conclusion, supported by both the earlier analysis of 12 cases and this analysis 
'A relationship between the pairs of variables is indicated by a clustering of cases in the cells 
along the diagonal (either upper left and lower right cells or upper right and lower left cells). The 
more cases that fall in these cells, the stronger the relationship (or higher the correlation) between the 
variables. 
of 23 cases, is that sue of a negotiation is an important variable. It distinguishes clearly among the 
cases in terms of a number of associated characteristics, such as treaty outcomes, stage-like processes. 
packaged issues, political relationships, firmness of deadlines, and turnover of delegates. 
Bilateral negotiations are more likely to be characterized by treaties, low turnover, stage-like 
processes and so on. These findings support Ikle's observation: "In bilateral negotiations the 'available 
terms' can be described more simply. If a government is negotiating an agreement that is to be cast 
in the form of a treaty, the terms available at any particular time consist of the articles agreed to, 
articles offered by the opponent, plus those terms for articles not yet discussed that the government 
expects its opponent would be ready to grant" (1964, p. 60). Bilateral negotiations may facilitate 
choosing among the "available terms." They also may be a more cost-effective alternative to 
participation in multilateral forums: fewer transaction costs and better outcomes. This information 
would seem to be quite valuable to the practicing diplomat. It calls attention to factors that can be 
controlled to produce binding agreements. It must be cautioned, however, that the findings should 
not be interpreted as an indictment of multilateral negotiations. These forums offer other benefits not 
available in bilateral settings. One is alliance coordination (see Dean, 1986). Another is the creation 
of communities of opinion that serve as regimes that regulate transactions among regional or global 
actors (e.g., Krasner, 1983). These advantages incur from conference diplomacy. They are not a 
result of negotiation intended to produce binding agreements. 
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IMPLICATIONS AND NEXT STEPS 
The results reported in this paper contribute in important ways to our knowledge of the 
processes and influences on negotiation. Four findings, in particular, address key issues in the 
literature. One is the relative importance of external (outside influences, political relationships) and 
internal (bureaucratic support) factors: the external factors had stronger impacts on processes and 
outcomes (see Hopmann and Smith, 1977). Another is the apparent "disconnect" between processes 
and outcomes: the process variables of stage-like progressions, openness, and threats did not 
distinguish among the different types of outcomes; alternatives and situational factors did (see 
Druckman, 1993). A third finding of interest is that while third parties were used in difficult 
circumstances (complex and competitive talks), their intervention had little impact on the outcome (see 
Wall and Lynn, 1993). And, most compelling perhaps is the clear distinction between bilateral and 
multilateral forums: the former is simply a more effective format for negotiating agreements (see 
Zartman, 1993). These and other findings demonstrate the value of this approach to analysis of 
negotiation. 
The approach illustrates also what can be done with direct interviews of negotiators. The 
insights reflect their experiences; the findings are closer to the actual conduct of negotiation than 
much of the research conducted on this topic to date. We are provided with windows on aspects of 
negotiation - delegations, bureaucratic support, processes -- that are not transparent in second-hand 
accounts of cases. And, perhaps for the first time, we were able to use this information to compare 
different cases in a systematic manner. The comparisons aid in distinguishing types or "species" of 
negotiations in terms of the general categories used in the interviews. They also call to the 
practitioner's attention past cases that may be most similar to a current negotiation in which he or she 
is engaged. This is one way of using lessons from the past to inform current practice; for example, 
guidance is provided by knowing that similar past cases succeeded when the talks were held in private 
and the delegations had attractive alternatives to a negotiated agreement. However, the insights 
obtained and the guidance offered may be limited to the particular sample of cases included in the 
analysis. The extent to which these results apply more generally to a wider set of cases and 
delegations can only be ascertained by extending the coverage in further studies. The extent to which 
the information obtained in the interviews reflects the critical factors in negotiation depends on the 
validity of the conceptual framework from which the questions derive. 
With regard to coverage of cases, the 23 negotiations examined here are an opportunity 
sample determined for the most part by availability and convenience. On the one hand, this presents 
a problem for statistical analysis: Although there is considerable variety in the set, with coverage of 
economic, environmental, and security talks, the sample is not representative in the sense that it was 
drawn randomly from a known universe of cases. On the other hand, this particular set of cases 
reflects significant negotiating experiences not generally available in published documents; they have 
important policy implications for Austria and other European countries. Moreover, as noted above, 
the information gathered came directly from the participants. Any attempt to expand the coverage 
would undoubtedly move us in the direction of coding information from secondary sources. We are 
faced with a "trade-off' of advantages and disadvantages. The smaller opportunity sample yields 
valuable first-hand information; the larger representative sample of cases may depend largely on 
secondary sources for information. The larger sample, while useful for developing a repository of 
information, suffers from lack of information in such categories as bureaucratic support and 
processes. A next step entails extending the coverage with cases on which sufficient relevant 
information is available, either from primary or secondary sources. 
With regard to types of information, the interview guide was inevitably selective in terms of 
the kinds of probes made. Information about only certain types of processes and outcomes were 
gathered and coded. It would be useful, for example, to elicit responses about formulas or 
frameworks used to guide the discussions, further details on exchanges of concessions or log-rolling 
dynamics, such statements made in the give-and-take as commitments, promises, accommodations, 
any role-reversing that may have occurred, and coalitions that cut across delegations on certain issues. 
On outcomes, further specification of effectiveness is needed: What criteria ought to be used to 
distinguish between effective and ineffective outcomes? Related to the issue of effectiveness is 
implementation: How durable was the agreement? Other questions could be added in other categories 
as well, and the particular questions asked (or variables represented in the interview) will reflect 
particular conceptual approaches to negotiation; an expanded set of questions can indeed represent 
several conceptual approaches or new hypotheses about factors that affect the process or outcome. 
But, the interview can also be contracted. A number of the questions asked resulted in highly 
asymmetrical response distributions: for example, importance of agendas, location of conference. 
These could be dropped from future versions of the interview guide. Further expansion and 
refinement of the interview guide would also benefit from closer working relationships with 
international diplomats similar to those developed in the context of this project. 
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APPENDIX A: Coding Manual 
TYPE OF NEGOTIATION: 1 = economic (N=6); 2 = environmental (N=6); 3 = security (N=4); 
other (N=7) 
I. STRUCTURE 
a. Number of delegations: 1 =bilateral (N =7); 2 =small multilateral (8-20) (N = 5); 
3 =medium multilateral (21-75) (N=6); 4=large multilateral (> 75) (N=5) 
b. Private or public: 1 =private (N= 15); 2=mixed (N=4); 3 =public (N=4) 
c. Length of negotiation: 1 =days (N =2); 2 =months (N=7); 3 =years (N= 14) 
d. Relative power of delegations: 1 =Austrian delegation stronger (N=9); 2=equal 
(N=5); 3=weaker (N=9) 
e. Informal meetings: 1 =many (N= 14); 2=some (N=4); 3 =few or none (N=5) 
f. Length of preparation: 1 =years (N=7); 2 = monthslweeks (N= 12); 3 =days or 
none (N=4) 
g. Secretariat involvement: 1 =highly involved (N = 7); 2-somewhat involved (N = 4); 
3 =not involved (N = 8); 4 =no secretariat (N = 4) 
11. COMPOSITION OF DELEGATIONS 
a. Size of delegations: 1 =small (> 3) (N = 1 1); 2 =medium (4-9) (N = 10); 3 =large 
(>9)  (N=2) 
b. Turnover: 1 =no changes (N= 12); 2=some changes (N=7); 3 =many changes 
(N = 4) 
c. Technical knowledge: 1 =whole delegation (N=7); 2=most of delegation (N=8); 
3 =SO% or less of delegation (N= 8) 
d. Chief-ofdelegation control: 1 =high control (N=5); 2 =moderate control (N= 3); 
3 =no control, delegator of tasks (N= 10) 
e. Differences in culture: 1 =yes (N = 6); 2 =no (N = 14) 
f. Number agencies represented: 1 =none (N= 6); 2 =few (N=7); 3 =many (N= 3) 
g. Experience: 1 =very (N= 8); 2=quite (N= 8); 3 =little (N= 1) 
h. Negotiate in other forums: 1 =yes (N= 15); 2 =no (N= 3) 
i. Relationship among delegations: 1 =very friendly (N=4); 2 =friendly (N= 12); 
3 =neutral (N =3); 4 =fluctuating (N=4) 
III. BUREAUCRATIC SUPPORT 
a. Instructions: 1 =highly constrained (N = 7); 2 =somewhat constrained (N = 8); 
3 =no constraints (N = 8) 
b. Latitude: 1 =no latitude (N=5); 2 =some latitude (N=9); 3 =latitude (N=9) 
c. Tracking by high-level officials: 1 =regular (N= 19); 2 =irregular (N=4) 
d. Analytical support: 1 =yes (N= 15); 2 =no (N= 8) 
IV. ISSUES 
a. Total issues: 1 = few (N = 4); 2 = many (N = 9) 
b. Number of major issues: l=1-2 (N=8); 2=3-4 (N=ll) ;  3 =  > 4  (N=4) 
c. Package: l=yes (N=15); 2=no (N=8) 
d. Interests or ideology: 1 = interests (N = 15); 2 =ideology or both (N = 8) 
V. THE NEGOTIATING SITUATION 
a. Deadlines: l=firm (N=7); 2=not firm (N=5); 3=none ( N = l l )  
b. Publicity: 1 =wide coverage (N=7); 2 =limited coverage (N = 16) 
c. Location: 1 =Capital city (N = 20); 2 =peripheral (N = 0) 
e. BATNAs: 1 =attractive (N = 4); 2 =unattractive (N = 19) 
f. Public awareness of issues: 1 =much (N=4); 2=some (N=8); 3=very little 
(N=11) 
VI. THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS 
a. Study or strategizing: 1 =primarily study (N = 17); 2 =primarily strategy (N = 6) 
b. Agendas: 1 =important (N= 16); 2=partial (N= 1); 3 =not followed (N= 3) 
c. Procedures vs. substance: 1 = substantive (N = 12); 2 =both (N = 3); 3 =procedural 
(N=3) 
d. Comprehensive direction: 1 =comprehensive (N = 12); 2 =partial (N = 6) 
e. Stages: 1 =stage-like process (N= 17); 2=no stages (N=6) 
f. Tit-for-tat: 1 =yes (N = 11); 2 =both (N = 3); 3 = not TFT (N = 4) 
g. Problem-solving: 1 =problem-solving process (N= 14); 2 =other (N =4) 
h. Predictable: 1 =predictable/framework (N= 15); 2= not predictable (N= 3) 
i.  Threats: 1 =frequent (N = 4); 2 =occasional (N = 8); 3 = infrequent (N = 1 1) 
j. Open process: 1 =open (N = 12); 2 =mixed (N = 6); 3 =concealing (N = 5) 
W. OUTCOMES 
a. Treaty or other: 1 =treaty (N = 12); 2= binding agreement (N =5); 3 =non-binding 
agreement (N = 6) 
b. Comprehensiveness: 1 = comprhensive resolution (N = 17); 2 =partial resolution 
(N=6) 
c. Calculable gains: 1 =yes (N=8); 2=no (N=7) 
d. Effectiveness: 1 =effective (N = 13); 2 =not effective (N =5) 
VIII. EVENTS 
a. Outside influences: 1 =yes (N=9); 2=no (N= 14) 
b. Political relationships: 1 =positive (N = 19); 2 =negative (N =4) 
c. Linkages: 1 =yes (N= 15); 2=no (N=8) 
d. Changes during talks: 1 =yes (N=6); 2=no (N= 12). 

APPENDIX B 
Interview Guide 
for Com~ara t ive  Methodolo~v and Analvtical Reauirements Studiq  
For the Interviewer; 
The interview seeks descriptions of nine major elements of a negotiation: the structure of the 
talks, the structure and composition of the delegations, the bureaucratic support structure, the issues, 
the immediate situation facing negotiators, analytical support, the process, the outcomes, and events 
taking place away from the negotiation. This guide is intended to elicit information during an 
interview, not to be completed by a respondent as a questionnaire. The information should be coded 
by analysts rather than the informants, although occasionally we ask the informant to "rate" or "scale" 
his or  her answer to a question about "the extent to which ..." Some questions may not be relevant 
for particular cases, and these need not be answered. Note, also, that some questions (marked with 
*) should be answered as it applies for delegation if possible. The respondent should answer 
for hisher own delegation and provide, at least, a typical range for other delegations. 
Background of Interviewee 
Name: 
Date of Interview: 
Negotiation (and subprocess, if applicable): 
Date of Negotiation described: 
Your RoleIPosition in Delegation andlor in Negotiation: 
I. Structure of the Negotiation 
How many national delegations were represented around the table? 
Was the venue primarily public (a visible negotiation), private, or a combination 
where some sessions were public and others private? 
What was the length of the negotiation in terms of rounds, plenary sessions, or 
monthslyears? 
Would you consider your delegation powerful or weak in comparison to others at the 
negotiation? Was there a wide divergence (asymmetry) in power between the various delegations or 
coalitions in the negotiation? What was the source of your power (military, economic, or political)? 
How many "off-the-record" consultations - or informal meetings -- occurred among 
the various delegations - before the talks and then during the talks? If you have difficulty coming 
up with a number, perhaps, you can distinguish among many, some, few, or none. 
How much time did your delegation use in preparing for the negotiation, first, before 
it began, and, second, between rounds. Please try to be specific in terms of a time unit such as days, 
weeks, or months. What was the typical amount of time for other delegations? What was the range 
of time for other delegations? 
For large conferences only: To what extent was the conference secretariat active in 
structuring the conference and remained involved in the discussions as opposed, for example, to 
merely making arrangements and handling physical logistics? 
Are there any other observations about the structure of the negotiation that you would 
like to make? 
11. Structure and Com~osition of the Deleeationst 
What was the size of your national delegation in terms of delegates present during the 
plenary sessions? What was the typical size of other delegations? What was the range of sizes for 
other delegations? 
Was there frequent turnover of delegates? How often, during the course of the 
negotiation, did the chief-ofdelegation change? How often were other members of the delegation 
replaced? 
Roughly what percentage of the delegates had specialized technical knowledge on the 
issues or certain aspects of the issues? How technical did the delegates have to be? 
Did the chief-ofdelegation exert very much control over the other delegates? Can you 
tell us something about his or her "style?" For example, as primarily someone who connols others 
or as a delegaror of responsibilities and tasks? 
Were there major differences across delegations in terms of culture and language? 
Which national agencies had representatives on your delegation? How many agencies 
were represented? On other delegations, were several national agencies usually represented? If so, 
what type and how many? 
How experienced were the delegates? For example, how many previous international 
negotiations did they take part in? 
Have these same delegations negotiated in other forums, on other issues? Did they 
reach satisfactory agreements in those negotiations? 
Would you say that the relationship among delegations was primarily friendly, neutral, 
or antagonistic? Cite any relationships that were particularly extreme. 
Are there any other observations about the composition of the delegations that you 
would like to make? 
m, Bureaucratic Su~-port Structure* 
T o  what extent were the delegations constrained by instructions from national agencies 
prior to commencement of negotiations? 
. . How often were instructions received from the home office during the 
negotiation? 
. . How much latitude did the instructions give to the delegation? 
. . How often was the delegation required to report its deliberations to the home 
office? 
Would you say that the delegation's objectives were clearly defined or vague? 
T o  what extent was there disagreement among national agencies on obiectives (very 
much, somewhat, or little)? T o  what extent was there disagreement on the issues? 
Who was the highest level national official paying attention to this issue? Was this 
negotiation high or low on hisher  agenda? Did he or  she keep track of developments on a regular 
or irregular basis? 
Were there changes of national administration during the negotiations? If so, how 
frequent? Did any of these changes lead to changed objectives or positions during the talks? 
Would you like to make any other observations about the functioning of the 
bureaucratic support structure during the negotiation? 
How many major issues were on the table? Were there any minor issues; if so, how 
many? 
With regard to each major issue, did it change or get redefined during the course of 
the talks? 
Were the issues highly, somewhat, or only slightly interrelated? Were they defined 
as parts of a package such that trade-offs could occur? 
Was there much or little public awareness of the issues? 
. . In general, around the world? 
. . Within each of the countries represented at the talks? 
Please rate each issue as being highly complex, somewhat complex, or not complex 
at all? Perhaps you can distinguish between technical and political complexity, by rating each of these 
types of complexity separately? 
. . On the same rating "scale," how technical do you consider the issue in terms 
of needed specialized expertise on the delegations? 
How important is the issue in terms of each delegation's (or coalition's) objectives 
for the negotiation, as discussed earlier? 
. . Would you say that there was much, somewhat, or very little agreement 
among the delegations on their ranking of this issue in terms of relative importance? 
Can you indicate the "size" of the differences among the delegations in their positions 
on this issue, e.g., very far apart, not far apart, or quite close? 
Would you say that the issue focuses primarily on differences in interests or 
ideologies? 
Do you have any other observations, not covered by the questions above, about the 
issues? 
V. Analvtical S u ~ ~ o r t  
Our goal in this section is to evaluate how information and analysis were used or could have been 
used to facilitate the negotiattanon process and enhance the joint outcome. 
What information or analytical assistance was provided to your delegation by your 
home office, conference secretariat, NGOs, or others - in the planning stage and during the 
negotiation? 
. . Did this support change over time? 
Was it sufficient? 
. . Did it have a positivelnegative impact on how well your delegation fared in 
the negotiation outcome, in your estimation? 
Were there any special infrastructure or special staff roles assigned to gather and 
process information, and conduct studies and analyses, either in the home ofice or on the delegation - 
- before and during the negotiation? 
. . Did your delegation have the resources to collect and analyze information? 
. . Was information collected by the delegation and then sent to the home office 
for analysis? 
What types of analyses were conducted before or during the negotiation? For 
example, (a) analyses to develop your own side's positions, strategies, and proposals, (b) analyses 
of the other side's positions, strategies, and proposals, or (c) analyses of possible outcomes. 
(a) Analyses for own side 
. . Were the analyses conducted in a formal, structured manner or an informal 
manner? 
. . Did it have a positivelnegative impact on how well your nation fared in the 
negotiation outcome, in your estimation? Was the information used 
effectively? 
(b) Analyses of other side 
. . Were the analyses conducted in a formal, structured manner or an informal 
manner? 
. . Did it have a positive/negative impact on how well your nation fared in the 
negotiation outcome, in your estimation? Was the information used 
effectively? 
(c) Analyses of outcomes 
. . Were the analyses conducted in a formal, structured manner or an informal 
manner? 
. . Did it have a positive/negative impact on how well your nation fared in the 
negotiation outcome, in your estimation? Was the information used 
effectively? 
In hindsight, what problems were encountered and what opportunities missed because 
information was not available or  analyses not conducted? Was the need felt for more indepth 
scientific analysis, decision support tools, etc.? 
VI. The Nwotiatine Situation 
Was there a fixed deadline for getting an agreement? If so, how firm was the 
deadline? 
. . If there was no official deadline, were there other types of time constraints 
on the delegates to come to decisions? 
With regard to publicity for the talks, was the coverage wide or limited, first, within 
each of the delegations' countries, and, second, more generally around the world? 
Were the talks held at a central (or capital city) or peripheral (country-side) location, 
or were some sessions in the city, others in the country? 
Were third-parties involved? If so, who were they: for example, mediators, 
international organizations, non-participating governments? 
. . If there was third-party involvement, how active were they in influencing the 
negotiation process? 
For each delegation, were there attractive (or unattractive) alternatives to negotiating 
an agreement in this negotiation? Can you indicate what their alternatives may have been? 
Is there anything else that you would like to say about the negotiating situation? 
W. The Neeotiatin~ Process 
How did your delegation prepare for the talks, primarily by studying the issues or by 
formulating a strategy for "winning?" Did the prenegotiation period include both forms of 
preparation? Was this typical of how other delegations prepared? Please describe. 
. . Would you say that the approach taken during the prenegotiation period 
consisted primarily of developing tactics for "winning" or developing solutions to a problem shared 
by other delegations who were consulted? 
To what extent did the agenda influence the way the talks were conducted, with regard 
to procedures and to the way the issues were discussed? 
. . To what extent was the conference dominated by procedural versus substantive 
activities by the delegations or the secretariat? 
Were the talks directed toward achieving a comprehensive package that included all 
issues or toward partial agreements where "success" would be achieved if a few of the issues were 
resolved? 
Would you say that the process progressed in stages from the general to the specific 
or did it take a less predictable form? How would you depict the unfolding process in this 
negotiation? 
How would you characterize the pattern of concession-making (tit-for-tat)? 
. . Were there reciprocal moves such that it was possible to gauge how much 
each party gave up on each issue? 
. . Or, did the process consist primarily of a problem-solving debate toward the 
discovery of new solutions to the issues? 
Was the general shape of the agreement known in advance? Put another way, was 
there a framework or formula constructed from which an agreement of details could be crafted? 
To what extent did the delegates use such tactics as threats, promises, or 
commitments to influence their counterparts on other delegations? Often, occasionally, rarely? 
Can the negotiation be depicted as open, in other words, did the delegates reveal or 
conceal important information about their interests or positions? Was evasion often used in response 
to direct questions from other delegations? 
Anything else not covered by the questions on the process? 
MII, Negotiation Outcome 
What type of agreement occurred? 
- Treaty? 
- Executive agreement? 
- Non-binding resolution? 
- Explicit but informal understanding? 
- Self-restraint contingent on the other delegations' behavior? 
- Suspension with intention to reconvene? 
- Deadlock or stalemate? 
- Other not included above? 
Of the issues you identified earlier, which were resolved? Was the agreement partial 
(only some issues resolved) or comprehensive (all issues resolved)? 
How many interim agreements were reached, e.g., a framework agreement, agreement 
in principle, agreement on some issues contingent on other arrangements? 
Is it possible to "calculate" gains and loses for each delegation? Can you distinguish 
between relatively short-term and long-term gains or losses incurred by the outcome? Who came out 
"best," "worst," somewhere in the middle? 
If an agreement was reached, how long has it been in effect since concluding the 
talks? 
. . Were provisions made for renegotiating the agreement? How explicit were 
these provisions? 
Can you "rate" the outcome in terms of gffectiveness? If an agreement was reached, 
did it serve as a genuine resolution of the issues (very effective), a settlement short of resolution 
(somewhat effective), or  simply a way of managing the problems defined by the issues? 
Any other thoughts about the outcome? 
Did non-participating governments, international organizations or nongovernmental 
organizations exert an influence on the talks? Was the influence helpful in terms of getting an 
agreement or not helpful in the sense of contributing to a stalemate? 
How would you characterize the general political relationships among the parties 
represented at the talks? For each pair of nationslcoalitions, were relations very positive, somewhat 
positive, neutral, or negative? 
Were there any linkages (connections) made to other negotiating forums (a) involving 
the same parties or (b) involving the same issue-areas? If so, which talks? 
Did any important changes occur in international politics during the talks? Would any 
of these events be considered crises? Any positive changes in international relationships? 
. . For each event, was it related or unrelated to the talks? 
. . For each event, was it a positive or negative influence on the process or 
outcome? 
Finally, would you like to offer other thoughts about events outside the conference 
that may have had an impact? 
%nk you very much for your rime. We will share with you any resultsfrom the analyses of 
the infonnation that you and others have provided. 
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